Induced Moods, Warning Messages, and Gambling Behavior by Bradley, Lindsey
Georgia Southern University 
Digital Commons@Georgia Southern 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies, Jack N. Averitt College of 
Summer 2018 
Induced Moods, Warning Messages, and Gambling 
Behavior 
Lindsey Bradley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bradley, Lindsey, "Induced Moods, Warning Messages, and Gambling Behavior" (2018). 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1791. 
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/1791 
This thesis (open access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies, Jack 
N. Averitt College of at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia 
Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu. 
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by 
LINDSEY BRADLEY 
(Under the Direction of Ty W. Boyer) 
ABSTRACT  
Gambling behavior is maintained by cognitive biases (Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Sharpe, 2002) which 
stem from an automatic level of thinking, referred to as System 1 (Kahneman, 2011). System 2 thinking is 
more deliberative than System 1, but requires more cognitive effort. System 2 is only activated when 
necessary. Positive affect increases reliance on System 1, often leading to an increase in risky behavior. 
Negative affect increases reliance on System 2, often leading to a decrease in risky behavior. Researchers 
argue that mandatory warning messages should be implemented in gambling venues to caution patrons 
against the dangers of problem gambling (Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, & Shaffer, 2004; Ginley, Whelan, 
Pfund, Peter, & Meyers, 2017; Steenbergh, Whelan, Meyers, May, & Floyd, 2004). Pop-up warning 
messages (Monaghan & Blaszczynski, 2010) containing information meant to correct gambling-related 
cognitive biases (Ginley et al., 2017) are most effective. The current study sought to bridge a gap between 
the literature on gambling warning messages and literature on the effect of affect on risky decision-
making. If a case is to be made for implementing mandatory gambling warning messages, it is important 
to examine if the effectiveness of warning messages is modulated by affect. Participants were randomly 
assigned to be induced with either positive or negative affect, and to either receive gambling warning 
messages or not receive gambling warning messages. It was hypothesized that those induced with positive 
affect would have higher levels of risk-taking than those induced with negative affect. It was also 
hypothesized that there would be an interaction effect between affect condition and warning message 
condition. Results showed that there was not a significant difference in risk-taking behavior between 
those who received warning messages and those who did not receive warning messages. There was a 
trend towards a significant difference based on affect condition, in that those induced with negative affect 
had slightly higher levels of risk-taking than those induced with positive affect. No significant interaction 
effects were detected. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
People are faced with opportunities to engage in risky behaviors on a daily basis. Risk-taking 
behaviors are typically defined as actions that are known to have potentially negative outcomes (Boyer, 
2006; Reyna & Farley, 2006). These behaviors encompass a wide variety of actions including, but not 
limited to: drinking and driving, substance abuse, unprotected sex, and gambling. The Research Institute 
on Addictions (2012) found that over 80 percent of Americans participate in gambling activities every 
year. In addition, the 2016 Survey of Problem Gambling Services in the United States stated that 5.45 
million Americans reported a problem with gambling in the past year (National Council on Problematic 
Gambling, 2016). Problem gambling (i.e., excessive gambling) can lead to difficulties in one’s daily life, 
such as complications with relationships, finances, and jobs (Wang, 2016). According to the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: 5th Edition (DSM-5), problem gambling can lead to a 
diagnosis of gambling disorder, which is currently the only behavioral addiction disorder recognized 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). To be diagnosed with a gambling disorder, at least four of the 
following symptoms/behaviors must have occurred during the past year: the need to gamble with an 
increasing amount of money to achieve a desired level of excitement, feeling restless or irritable when 
trying to reduce gambling, repeated unsuccessful efforts to reduce gambling, frequent thoughts about 
gambling, gambling when distressed, returning to “get even” (i.e., win back lost money) after losing, 
lying to conceal gambling activity, relying on others to help with financial difficulties caused by 
gambling, and/or jeopardizing a significant relationship, job, educational opportunity, or career 
opportunity due to gambling (Wang, 2016).  
Problem gambling can have disastrous consequences, and the question remains whether effective 
preventative measures can be implemented. However, in order to contemplate potential preventative 
measures, one must consider how problem gambling develops and is maintained. For instance, gamblers 






an important role in whether one chooses to engage in risky behaviors, such as gambling. The issues of 
cognitive biases and affect, including their relation to one another, will be further addressed. 
Gambling and Cognitive Biases 
From a cognitive perspective, gambling behavior is maintained by irrational beliefs or cognitive 
biases (Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Sharpe, 2002). Examples of gambling-related cognitive biases 
include believing that future outcomes of a random event can be predicted based on previous outcomes 
(i.e., the gambler’s fallacy), believing that certain strategies can increase the chances of winning, or 
attributing positive outcomes to internal factors (e.g., skill) and negative outcomes to external factors 
(Emond & Marmurek, 2010; Gobet & Schiller, 2011; Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Sharpe, 2002). Though 
individuals tend to rely on these beliefs when they gamble, these beliefs are inaccurate. It is likely that 
early gambling experiences, such as big wins, contribute to the development of cognitive biases (Sharpe, 
2002). These cognitive biases then cause people to focus on positive outcomes more so than negative 
outcomes associated with gambling behavior.  
These cognitive biases stem from a reliance on automatic thought processes. Kahneman (2011) 
argues that there are two separate systems of thought processes. System 1 is automatic, quick, and 
intuitive. Also referred to as “fast” thinking, this system requires very little cognitive effort and offers no 
sense of voluntary control (Kahneman, 2011). Capabilities of System 1 include innate skills (e.g., 
perception) as well as learned skills that have become automatic through continued practice (e.g., 
reading). On the other hand, System 2 is slower and requires more cognitive effort and attention. 
Examples of System 2 capabilities include comparing items, counting the number of times someone says 
“like” during a class presentation, and self-control. Though both systems have their own set of 
capabilities, they often work together. 
System 2 has limited resources and typically runs at low-effort levels unless called upon 
(Kahneman, 2011). System 1 generates suggestions for System 2 (e.g., beliefs, feelings, ideas), and the 






from System 1 or modify it. This process usually happens with little effort. However, sometimes the 
process is not as simple and System 1 must defer to System 2. System 2 must be mobilized (i.e., 
temporarily stop functioning at a low effort level to allocate resources to the current situation) when 
System 1 cannot generate an answer or when an event occurs that goes against System 1’s expectations 
(e.g., when one is surprised). System 1 is usually effective in making judgments and decisions, but it is 
not perfect. Therefore, it is prone to errors and biases. However, both systems are responsible when an 
error occurs. System 1 may have generated the suggestion, but System 2 endorsed the suggestion and 
allowed it to be expressed into action. System 2 may endorse an incorrect suggestion from System 1 
because System 2 did not realize the suggestion was incorrect or because System 2 did not apply the 
appropriate cognitive effort to catch the error. Errors can stem from cognitive biases (e.g., irrational 
thinking) or the use of heuristics. There are several cognitive biases and heuristics that are common to 
gambling. 
A heuristic is a simple process that allows one to find an acceptable, though potentially imperfect, 
answer to a difficult question (Kahneman, 2011). When System 1 has difficulty generating a suggestion, it 
may employ the use of a heuristic to find a simpler answer. Though heuristics can be effective, they are 
not foolproof. System 2 does have the ability to reject a heuristic answer; however, System 2 often 
chooses to employ the least amount of cognitive effort necessary. Therefore, heuristic answers suggested 
by System 1 are often endorsed by System 2, even if the heuristic is incorrect. The tendency to rely on 
System 1 instead of the effortful System 2 can likely to be attributed to the idea that humans are cognitive 
misers (Fiske, 1980; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). Humans tend to use cognitive simplifying 
tools, such as heuristics, to preserve cognitive resources when possible. 
The representativeness heuristic and the gambler’s fallacy. One cognitive error common to 
gambling is the representativeness heuristic, which involves judging probabilities based on how 
representative “A” is of “B” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This method can lead to misconceptions of 






can be predicted based on previous outcomes). When the representativeness heuristic is used, it is 
expected that a random sequence of events will be representative of the possible outcomes, even if the 
sequence is short. For gambling, this means that people believe that the sequence of events generated 
when gambling should be representative of the potential outcomes (i.e., representative sequence of both 
wins and losses). Therefore, people often believe a win is due when they are faced with multiple losses. 
Individuals tend to believe that a deviation in one direction (e.g., a loss) should cause a deviation in the 
other direction (i.e., a win), even though this belief violates the laws of chance (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974).  
Cognitive Biases. System 1 can also give rise to cognitive biases (Kahneman, 2011). A cognitive 
bias can be defined as an implicit association that distorts judgment away from the norms of rationality 
(Holroyd, 2015). Cognitive biases are difficult to prevent because they occur at an automatic level. 
Though System 2 has the capacity to prevent one from acting on a cognitive bias, the fact that System 2 
has limited resources can keep this from happening. In addition, it is impractical for System 2 to replace 
System 1 for routine decision-making, as System 2 is too slow. There are often many cognitive biases 
present in gamblers, which may be due to the fact that repetition (i.e., repeated gambling, in this case) 
increases reliance on System 1. A slot machine is a common form of gambling that is very repetitive. All 
that is required is for one to press a button or pull a lever repeatedly to keep the reels spinning. Mccusker 
and Gettings (1997) argued that they provided evidence that cognitive biases operate at an automatic 
level. In their experiment, problem gamblers completed a Stroop task. Participants were asked to view 
words presented in different colors, and say the name of the color of the word out loud. Participants 
viewed neutral words, gambling related words, and words pertaining to other addictions (e.g., drugs). 
Participants demonstrated slower reaction times (for naming the color of the word) on gambling related 
words than neutral words or words pertaining to other addictions. These results indicated that there was 
interference, which made it difficult to suppress gambling-related information. Concentrating on naming 






interfered with System 2 on trials containing gambling-related words. This interference resulted in slower 
reaction times on these trials.  
Illusion of Control. The illusion of control may stem from a misconception of luck versus chance. 
Though academic conceptions of luck and chance may be virtually the same, individuals tend to view 
chance as something that is external and uncontrollable, while luck is something internal that they can 
“use” (Wagenaar & Keren, 1988; Wohl & Enzle, 2002). In other words, people feel more confident about 
their chances of winning when they feel as though they have control over some aspect of a situation (e.g., 
choosing their own numbers) because they think they can use their luck to make the desired outcome 
more likely to happen. Interviews with gamblers revealed that most believed gambling outcomes were 
due to combinations of chance, luck, and skill. This demonstrates that gamblers do not perceive chance 
and luck to be the same. Though System 2 likely contains the knowledge (i.e., luck and chance are 
virtually the same, and cannot be controlled) to suppress this cognitive illusion, it often does not engage 
the required cognitive effort to reject the suggestion from System 1. 
Gamblers exhibit a perceived illusion of control over the outcome of a game, even though the 
outcome is due to chance. This cognitive bias leads them to believe that certain rituals (e.g., blowing on 
the dice before rolling them) or strategies can increase their chance to win or that they can predict the 
outcome (Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Wohl & Enzle, 2002). When participants were given the chance to 
choose their own lottery ticket, they reported feeling as though they had greater chances of winning and 
greater perceptions of personal luck than participants who were not allowed to choose their own lottery 
ticket (Wohl & Enzle, 2002). In addition, a positive relationship was found between perceived chance of 
winning and perceived personal luck. The authors attributed this to the idea that participants believed they 
could use their personal luck to increase their chance of winning. A similar study involved playing 
roulette (Dixon, 2000). Participants could choose their own chip placement on some trials and the dealer 
chose their chip placement on other trials. Participants placed higher bets when they could control their 






they thought their chances of winning were, participants overestimated their chances of winning when 
they controlled the chip placement and underestimated their chances of winning when the dealer 
controlled the chip placement. These studies provide evidence for the idea that illusion of control leads 
one to believe they can increase their opportunity to win a game of chance.  
Affect 
Affect plays an important role in the decision-making process, and can influence one’s decision 
on whether to engage in a risky behavior such as gambling (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001; Kahneman, 
2011; Schwarz, 2012). Affect, mood, and emotion are terms that are often used interchangeably. Mood 
refers to a relatively enduring affective state that does not necessarily have a known cause, emotion refers 
to an intense, short lived feeling with a known cause, and affect refers to a general state that encompasses 
both mood and emotion (Forgas, 1995). There are two main types of emotions related to decisions: 
integral emotions and incidental emotions. Integral emotions are produced in response to the specific 
decision or task at hand; however, incidental emotions are irrelevant to the decision or task at hand and 
are the results of unrelated factors such as affect (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). 
According to the affect as information approach, emotions are incorporated into information used 
to make decisions, whether they are relevant to the target decision/task or not (Clore et al., 2001; 
Schwarz, 2012). The way in which affective states influence cognitive evaluations depends on the 
subjective experience of the affective state (Clore et al., 2001). In other words, the way affective 
information is experienced (e.g., intensity of affective information or the amount of attention the affective 
information receives) plays an important role in one’s cognitive evaluations of a judgment, decision, 
and/or task. Emotions provide conscious information from unconscious appraisals of situations. These 
emotions are used as feedback to guide decisions because they are experienced as information about a 
target. Affective information deals with how something makes you feel (e.g., good or bad) and/or how 
you feel about something (e.g., like or dislike). The value of affective information and its effect on 






influences judgment and decision-making if the affective information is attributed towards the object of 
judgment and/or the task at hand. Incidental emotions often provide affective information, but this 
information can be misleading (Schwarz, 2012). Feelings can be misattributed to an object/task that was 
not the actual reason for the feelings. Moods that result from background affective information that one is 
not completely aware of (i.e., incidental emotions) are often subject to misattribution. This happens 
because people are often much more sensitive to their feelings than where the feelings come from 
(Schwarz, 2012). People typically assume that their current feelings are about whatever is in their mind 
and/or has their attention at that moment. The use of affect as information does not require conscious 
attribution to an object. In other words, affect can be used as information at an automatic level (System 
1), and does not necessarily require cognitive effort from System 2. System 1 is prone to errors (which 
System 2 often endorses), which also explains why affect can be misattributed to an incorrect source. 
Therefore, when individuals are gambling, they are likely relying on System 1 thinking and they may 
misattribute background affective information to the game (e.g., slot machine, video poker, blackjack, 
etc.) they are currently playing 
Positive and Negative Affective Processing. Affective reactions can be experienced differently 
depending on the judgment, decision, or task at hand. The affective processing principle states that 
affective information may be experienced as performance feedback when one is performing a task (Clore 
et al., 2001). In this case, positive affect may be experienced as feelings of confidence about one’s ability 
to perform the task (e.g., gambling), therefore leading to greater reliance on one’s own beliefs, 
expectations, and inclinations.  
When one is task-oriented, positive affect increases top-down processing, which relies on 
information such as context, one’s personal knowledge, beliefs, and expectations. In other words, positive 
affect increases the use of System 1. Positive affect gives one a state of cognitive ease, which makes one 
more likely to be in a good mood, like what they see, and trust their intuitions (Kahneman, 2011). When 






other hand, negative affect may be experienced as doubt about one’s ability to perform the task, therefore 
leading to lesser reliance on one’s own beliefs, expectations, and inclinations. In this case, negative affect 
increases bottom-up processing, which relies on data-based information from the environment instead of 
internal information. In other words, negative affect increases the use of System 2. Negative affect 
promotes a state of cognitive strain, which causes one to be more vigilant and suspicious, use more effort, 
and rely less on intuitions (Kahneman, 2011). When one is experiencing a negative mood, a more vigilant 
thinking process is employed (i.e., System 2). 
Positive affect has been shown to cause individuals to overestimate the likelihood of positive 
events, underestimate the likelihood of negative events (Wright & Bower, 1992), and to increase risk 
taking (Grable & Roszkowski, 2008; Stanton, Reek, Huettal, & LaBar, 2014; Schulreich et al., 2014). 
Since positive affect increases reliance on System 1, it reduces vigilance. When primed with happy music, 
participants were more likely to choose risky lottery choices (Schulreich et al., 2014). This is consistent 
with the results that those in a positive mood are more willing to take financial risks (Grable & 
Roszkowski, 2008) and gamble recklessly (Cummins, Nadorff, & Kelly, 2009; Stanton et al., 2014). This 
effect has been seen outside the laboratory as well. Researchers found that factors that caused incidental 
positive affect (such as sunny weather and local sports teams winning games) were positively related to 
the number of lottery tickets sold (Otto, Fleming, & Glimcher, 2016). When people were in a good mood, 
they were more likely to take a risk and buy a lottery ticket. The authors posed that positive affect may 
facilitate an optimism bias, which was defined by Sharot (2011) as the difference between one’s 
expectations and reality. When expectations are better than reality, it is considered an optimistic 
expectation. As with other cognitive biases, the optimism bias likely stems from System 1. This has 
important implications for gambling behavior, as problem gamblers who recently quit identified positive 
affect (Holub, Hodgins, & Peden, 2005) and feelings of optimism about their chances of winning 






Negative affect is often associated with risk aversiveness, which likely stems from an increased 
reliance on the more vigilant System 2. Those in a negative mood are more likely to underestimate the 
likelihood of positive events and overestimate the likelihood of negative events (Wright & Bower, 1992), 
which contributes to more risk-aversion (Yuen & Lee, 2003; Schulreich et al., 2014; Schulreich, 
Gerhardt, & Heekeren, 2016). When primed with negative affective stimuli (i.e., fearful stimuli), 
participants were less likely to accept a gamble, which indicates risk-aversiveness (Schulreich et al., 
2016). Negative affect likely mobilized System 2, which increased vigilance and cognitive effort. 
Participants also demonstrated risk-averse behavior when primed with sad music (Schulreich et al., 2014). 
After listening to sad music, participants were less likely to take a risky gamble than participants primed 
with happy music, random musical tones, or no music. Similarly, participants were also less likely to take 
a risky gamble after watching a sad film clip (Yuen & Lee, 2003). When given the option between a 
predictable, small reward and a risky, large reward, participants in an induced sad mood were less likely 
to take a risk than those who watched a happy or neutral film clip.  
Affect has strong implications for the judgment and decision-making process, particularly in 
terms of whether one chooses to engage in risky behaviors. When experiencing positive affect, System 2 
is more likely to remain in a low effort mode and allow System 1 to handle the decisions at hand. 
Therefore, people are more likely to take risks when they are experiencing positive affect. This is because 
positive affect causes people to trust their intuitions and is often viewed as confidence about a decision or 
performance on a task. When one is experiencing positive affect while gambling, they may feel more 
confident that they will win, and subsequently be more likely to gamble. On the other hand, System 2 is 
more likely to take over and expend cognitive effort when one is experiencing negative affect. Negative 
affect causes people to be more vigilant and cautious about decisions and is often experienced as doubt 
about a decision or performance on a task. Therefore, people are less likely to take risks when 
experiencing negative affect. When one is experiencing negative affect while gambling, they may feel 






affect can arise from incidental emotions, but may be misattributed to the current decision or task at hand. 
This allows affect, regardless of the original source, to influence many decisions and judgments. 
Gambling Warning Messages 
There are many opportunities for background affective information to be misattributed to the act 
of gambling itself. Affective information can stem from the weather (Otto et al., 2016), feelings about 
how one’s day has been, the gambling venue (e.g., lights, music, people, etc.), or numerous other factors. 
Depending on how the affective information is experienced (i.e., positively or negatively), it could 
potentially increase the likelihood that one will gamble. However, excessive gambling can have many 
negative effects on one’s life. Therefore, some believe that gambling venues should have mandatory 
warning messages to caution patrons against the dangers associated with excessive gambling 
(Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, & Shaffer, 2004; Ginley, Whelan, Pfund, Peter, & Meyers, 2017; Steenbergh, 
Whelan, Meyers, May, & Floyd, 2004). They argue that federal regulations have been implemented to 
caution consumers against other potentially harmful products, such as alcohol and tobacco; therefore, 
these regulations should extend to gambling venues as well. Blaszczynski and colleagues (2004) note that 
the decision to gamble is ultimately that of the individual; however, consumers should have the right to 
make an informed decision and the gambling industry should not intentionally exploit consumers. There 
are various factors that play into creating an effective warning, including message type (static versus pop-
up), timing, and content.  
Static warnings posted around the venue (signs on walls, gambling machines, etc.) are ineffective 
(Monahgan, Blaszczynski, & Nower, 2009). These posted warnings did not reduce gambling behavior or 
gambling related cognitive biases and participants could not recall the content of the warnings. These 
findings led researchers to explore other options for displaying effective warning messages. Compared to 
static warnings, pop-up warning messages were found to be much more effective (Monaghan & 
Blaszczynski, 2010). Pop-up messages are messages that “pop up” on the screen of an electronic 






of the screen, and interrupt play for a brief period of time to display a message. Monaghan and 
Blaszczynski (2010) tested the comparison of these two methods (static and pop-up warning messages) on 
both undergraduate students and patrons of a gambling venue. All participants, including those recruited 
from a gambling venue, played on a simulated electronic gambling machine (EGM). Some participants 
received warning messages in the form of static sign posted near the machine, while others received pop-
up messages during gameplay. No behavioral data was collected regarding gambling behavior or patterns. 
Participants who received pop-up warning messages during game play indicated via self-report measures 
that the messages caused them to stop playing earlier, place smaller bets, and slow their rate of betting. 
These effects were not reported for those who received posted warnings. Participants who received pop-
up messages also had significantly higher recall of the warning message content than those who received 
posted warnings. This same effect was indicated through a two-week follow-up questionnaire; 
participants were more likely to accurately recall the content of the pop-up messages than the static signs. 
In a naturalistic study of online gamblers, those who received pop-up warning messages were more likely 
to discontinue play sooner than those who did not receive warning messages (Auer, Malischnig, & 
Griffiths, 2014).  
It was questioned whether the fact that these pop-up warning messages caused a forced break in 
play was responsible for reducing gambling behavior rather than the content of the messages themselves; 
however, when participants were presented with blank pop-up messages, their gambling behavior was not 
reduced and their desire to continue playing increased (Blaszczynski, Cowley, Anthony, & Hinsley, 
2016). This indicates that any observed reduction in gambling behavior is due to the content of the 
warning messages and not simply being forced to stop play temporarily.   
Timing of the pop-up messages also appears relevant. Studies that have successfully reduced 
gambling behavior through messages aimed to correct cognitive biases programmed the messages to 
appear periodically throughout game play. When the pop-up messages appear before play and do not re-






This is likely because individuals do not maintain the same level of rational thinking while gambling as 
they do when they are not gambling (Pelletier & Ladouceur, 2007). This has been referred to as “double 
switching,” meaning that people can have rational beliefs about gambling, but turn them “off” while 
gambling (Sévigny & Ladouceur, 2003). In other words, one might think that their chances of winning the 
jackpot are slim while not gambling (i.e., rational thinking switched on), but then start to think their 
chances to win are much better once they start gambling (i.e., rational thinking switched off). Then, once 
they are finished gambling, they once again believe that their chances of winning the jackpot are low (i.e., 
rational thinking switched on). Once again, this could be attributed to the fact that repetition (e.g., 
repeatedly press the “spin” button on a slot machine) increases reliance on System 1. When one is not 
gambling, System 2 may suppress the suggestion from System 1 that the likelihood of winning the 
jackpot is high. Then, with repetition of gambling, an increased reliance on System 1 could cause System 
2 to not use its limited cognitive resources to suppress System 1, therefore allowing System 1 to express 
beliefs that the chances of winning the jackpot are high. This suggests that messages to correct cognitive 
biases should be presented throughout game play to help individuals maintain a rational level of thinking 
(i.e., rely less on System 1). 
The content of the warning messages is a crucial factor. Research has suggested that warning 
messages intended to reduce gambling-related cognitive biases are more effective than messages that 
provide information about the amount of time and money spent on a gambling session (Ginley et al., 
2017). For example, Floyd, Whelan, and Meyers (2006) presented participants with messages such as, 
“CAUTION: The result of any spin has nothing to do with previous spins” or “CAUTION: Winning is 
completely due to chance. No luck is involved.” Several studies have shown that when presented with 
these messages during game play, individuals stop play earlier and place smaller bets (Benhsain, et al., 
2004; Floyd et al., 2006; Jardin & Wulfert, 2009; Jardin & Wulfert, 2012; May, Whelan, Meyers, & 
Steenbergh, 2005). This effect has even been shown in experienced gamblers, defined as those who 






that provided accurate information about gambling contingencies were more effective in reducing 
gambling behavior (in terms of stopping play earlier and spending less money) than messages unrelated to 
the game or no messages at all. When presented with messages regarding the independence of events, 
participants demonstrated decreased cognitive biases and increased motivation to discontinue gambling 
than participants who received control messages simply stating they must press “okay” to continue 
(Benhsain, Taillefer, & Ladouceur, 2004). However, one study found that messages aimed at correcting 
the illusion of control while gambling reduced cognitive biases, but did not reduce the number of games 
played (Cloutier, Ladouceur, & Sévigny, 2006). It should be noted that this study only measured the 
number of games played, and not the amount of money bet per game. It could be possible that the chosen 
dependent variable was not sufficient to replicate the results of previous studies. The success of previous 
studies that have employed gambling warning messages aimed at correcting cognitive biases indicates 
that this can be an effective method to reduce gambling behavior.  
Cognitive biases cannot be eliminated, because they occur at an automatic level. However, their 
effect can be weakened. Many people are not aware of their cognitive biases because of the automaticity 
of System 1. Research on implicit bias reduction has found that increasing awareness of one’s cognitive 
biases can help weaken their effect on decision-making (Croskerry, 2003; Devine, Forscher, Austin, & 
Cox, 2012; Jackson, Hillard, & Schneider, 2014). Being aware of cognitive biases can help introduce self-
monitoring (e.g., System 2) of one’s decisions, leading to fewer cognitive errors (Croskerry, 2003). If one 
can recognize that they are in a situation in which they are prone to experiencing cognitive biases, System 
2 can be “called on” for help (Kahneman, 2011). Warning messages aimed to correct these biases could 
help increase awareness of common gambling related cognitive biases, and serve as a reminder that one is 
in a situation (e.g., gambling in a casino) where they are prone to cognitive errors. With repeated 
exposure to these messages, System 2 should learn to not endorse the incorrect suggestions from System 
1. When presented with information that challenges beliefs of System 1, System 2 can be activated and 






Evidence from research suggests implementing mandatory gambling warning messages could be 
a viable option for preventing the development of problem gambling. Previous research has indicated that 
pop-up warning messages are not very disruptive and do not hinder one’s enjoyment while gambling 
(Palmer du Preez, Landon, Bellringer, Garrett, & Abbott, 2016). To be the most effective, previous 
research suggests that these warning messages should attempt to correct common gambling-related 
cognitive biases, such as the gambler’s fallacy or the illusion of control. The goal of these warning 
messages would be to reduce reliance on System 1 thinking, and subsequently increase reliance on 
System 2 thinking. If System 2 thinking is activated, then one should be more vigilant in the decision-
making process.  
Current Study 
The current study is an attempt to merge two separate bodies of research that have not been 
previously explored in the context of one another. If a case is to be made for implementing mandatory 
gambling warning messages, their effectiveness must be examined in all contexts. As affect plays an 
important role in the decision-making process, it is important to examine if the effectiveness of gambling 
warning messages is modulated by affect. Based on previous research, the following hypotheses have 
been constructed: 
Hypothesis 1: Those induced with positive affect will display higher levels of risk-taking 
behavior than those who are induced with negative affect. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be an interaction effect between the affect and warning message 
conditions. 
2a: Those in the positive affect with warning messages condition will not differ in levels 
of risk-taking behavior from the positive affect without warning messages condition. 
2b: Those in the negative affect with warning messages condition will display lower 






condition, the positive affect with warning messages condition, and the positive affect 
without warning messages condition. 
Previous research has already demonstrated that positive affect is associated with increased risk-
taking, while negative affect is associated with decreased risk-taking. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is expected 
to replicate findings of existing research.  
Hypothesis 2a suggests that warning messages will not reduce gambling behavior for those 
induced with positive affect. Positive affect increases risk-taking behaviors, likely due to more reliance on 
System 1. Reliance on System 1 is also increased during repetitive tasks (e.g., gambling). Though System 
2 has the capacity to suppress System 1, it often chooses the easier (i.e., requires less cognitive effort) 
route of simply accepting System 1’s suggestions due to limited resources (Kahneman, 2011). With both 
positive affect and repetition causing an increase in reliance on System 1, it is hypothesized that System 2 
will choose to endorse System 1’s suggestions to spare cognitive resources. 
Hypothesis 2b suggests that participants who are induced with negative affect and receive 
warning messages should display the lowest levels of risk-taking. Negative affect mobilizes System 2, 
and causes one to be more vigilant and suspicious. With System 2 already mobilized, it is hypothesized 
that warning messages will increase vigilance further. In this case, System 2 should suppress any 

















A power analysis indicated that at least sixty-six participants would be necessary to detect any 
significant effects. The power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1. The parameters of the power 
analysis were α = 0.05, power = 0.80, and ηp2 = 0.11, which was the smallest reported ηp2 in previous 
research (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009). This indicated that a medium to large effect 
size could be expected.  
A total of 104 participants completed the study, but four participants were excluded from the 
analyses for failing at least one attention check question. Participants included 59 women and 41 men 
with a mean age of 19.47 years old (See Table 1). Participants were recruited from undergraduate 
psychology classes at Georgia Southern University through the SONA system and participated to fulfill a 
course requirement.  
Overview 
The study was completed in-person. Each participant came into the lab individually and 
completed all measures on a computer. All materials in this experiment were presented through E-Prime 
2.0. The study took approximately twenty minutes to complete. Half of the participants were induced with 
positive affect using a standardized method and half were induced with negative affect using a 
standardized method. In addition, half of the participants received gambling warning messages during a 
computerized gambling task and half received no messages. These two variables were counterbalanced to 
produce four distinct experimental conditions: a positive affect induced with warning messages condition 
(hereafter referred to as PM+); positive affect induced without warning messages condition (PM-); 
negative affect induced with warning messages condition (NM+); and negative affect induced without 






signed up for the experiment. In each condition, participants completed self-report measures and a 
behavioral measure of risk-taking (See Figure 1).  
Materials 
Affect Measure. Participants were given the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) twice. First to establish baseline affect levels at the beginning of the 
experiment and then to detect any change in affect level after viewing the emotional stimuli (Appendix 
A). The PANAS is a 20-item scale that was developed to assess positive and negative affect. Previous 
research has demonstrated that the PANAS has good construct validity and reliability (Crawford & 
Henry, 2004). The internal consistency for the current sample was calculated for both the positive affect 
scale (Cronbach’s α = .84) and the negative affect scale (Cronbach’s α = .86) for the PANAS 1 and for 
both the positive affect scale (Cronbach’s α = .87) and the negative affect scale (Cronbach’s α = .86) for 
the PANAS 2. 
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they were currently feeling a variety of 
positive and negative emotions on a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). To score 
this scale, the average of participants’ responses on all positive affective words was calculated, as well as 
the average of participants’ responses on all negative affective words. This resulted in each participant 
receiving two PANAS scores (a positive score and a negative score). 
Affective Stimuli. The affective stimuli consisted of two film clips chosen from an empirically 
validated database of emotion eliciting film clips (Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot, 2010). Film clips 
are an effective mood induction procedure (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 
2007; Schaefer et al., 2010; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). Film clips are low in demand 
characteristics, high in attentional capture, and elicit longer lasting affective states than still pictures 
(Rottenberg et al., 2007). Participants viewed one film clip, depending on which affective condition they 
were randomly assigned to. In the positive affect condition, participants viewed a scene from Dead Poet’s 






it ranked high in positive affect and arousal (i.e., intensity). In the negative affect condition, participants 
viewed a scene from Misery. In this scene, a woman prepares to break the ankles of a man she is holding 
captive. This film clip was chosen because it ranked high in negative affect and arousal. Each film clip 
was two minutes and twenty-four seconds in length. 
Behavioral Measure. To measure gambling/risk-taking behavior, participants completed a 
computerized game, The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002). The BART correlates 
with self-reported levels of real world risk-taking, including gambling (Wallsten, Pleskac, & Lejuez, 
2005). The BART also has good test-retest reliability, meaning that a participant’s performance on the 
task on one occasion should be representative of their performance on the task on other occasions (White, 
Lejuez, & Wit, 2008). 
Self-Reported Risk-Taking. Participants were given the 40-item Domain-Specific Risk-Taking 
scale (DOSPERT; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) to establish self-reported levels of real-world risk-taking 
behavior in financial, health/safety, recreational, ethical, and social domains (Appendix B). This scale was 
chosen to see if performance on the BART correlates with self-reported measures of risk-taking across 
different domains. Previous research has demonstrated that the BART is positively correlated with self-
reported risk-taking (Wallsten et al., 2005), and the current study expected to replicate these findings by 
analyzing the relationship between BART performance and scores on the DOPSERT domains. 
Participants were asked to rate the likelihood that they would engage in a variety of risky 
behaviors on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely). Participants received a total of six 
DOSPERT scores: a social domain score, health/safety domain score, financial domain score, ethical 
domain score, recreational domain score, and an overall score. The overall score was calculated by 
averaging participants’ responses on all DOSPERT items. The scores for each of the five domains were 
calculated by averaging participants’ responses for each DOPSERT item that fell within that domain. For 
example, to calculate participants’ score for the social domain, only responses on DOSPERT items 






current sample was calculated for the overall DOSPERT (Cronbach’s α = .83), ethical domain 
(Cronbach’s α = .73), financial domain (Cronbach’s α = .77), recreational domain (Cronbach’s α = .79), 
social domain (Cronbach’s α = .61), and health/safety domain (Cronbach’s α = .66). 
Procedure 
All participants recruited from the Georgia Southern University Department of Psychology were 
provided an informed consent upon entry to the lab. All questions about participants’ roles as participants 
were answered at the time of participation. All measures and tasks were presented in a computerized 
format through E-Prime 2.0. All participants wore headphones while completing the study. 
To establish baseline affect levels, participants in all conditions were given the Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) to assess the extent to which they felt a variety of emotions at that point 
in time. During the PANAS, two attention check questions were included. For example, one attention 
check question prompted participants to “press 5.” These two questions were implemented to ensure that 
participants were paying attention during the study. After completing the PANAS, participants in PM+ 
and PM- conditions were primed with the positive film clip (Dead Poet’s Society) and participants in the 
NM+ and NM- conditions were primed with the negative film clip (Misery). After viewing the film clip, 
participants moved on to the behavioral measure.  
Participants in all conditions completed a computerized game, the Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
(BART), as a behavioral measure of risk-taking. Participants viewed a screen that welcomed them to the 
“Balloon Pumping Game” and provided them with written instructions. Participants were told that the 
object of the game was to obtain as many points as possible. Points were earned by pumping the balloon 
up without popping the balloon. Participants were told that the balloon would explode at some point, 
which could be as early as the first pump or not until the balloon had fully expanded. Once participants 
viewed the instructions, they moved on to complete one practice trial prior to moving on to the 
experimental trials. Participants were presented with a simulated balloon, the number of points earned on 






were asked to “pump” the balloon (by pressing the “P” key). Participants earned ten points for each pump 
they made, provided they did not pop the balloon. Participants could pump the balloon as many times as 
they wished, or until the balloon burst. If the balloon burst, all points accumulated for that round were 
lost. If the participant stopped pumping (by pressing the “S” key) before the balloon burst, they kept all 
points earned on that round. Upon completion on the practice trial, participants moved on to complete the 
thirty experimental trials. The average number of pumps that participants made on each balloon that did 
not burst was used as the primary dependent measure of risk-taking. Higher numbers of pumps per 
balloon indicate higher levels of risk-taking. After each trial, a feedback screen (white background with 
black text) appeared (See Figure 2). The feedback screen either said “Congratulations! You won “x” 
points on that balloon!” or “Sorry, that balloon broke!” After one second, the feedback screen 
disappeared, and participants moved on to the next trial.         
During the BART, half of participants received computerized pop-up warning messages. These 
messages contained information intended to correct/reduce cognitive biases related to gambling. There 
were five different warning messages. Pop-up warning messages appeared every five trials. Therefore, 
participants in the warning message condition received a warning message upon the completion of the 
fifth, tenth, fifteenth, twentieth, and twenty-fifth trials. Participants received one warning message at a 
time, and participants received the warning messages in the same order. After the fifth BART trial, the 
warning message read: “You cannot control a game of chance.” After the tenth trial, the warning message 
read: “This is a game of chance. No luck is involved.”  After the fifteenth trial, the warning message read: 
“There are no strategies that will improve your chance of winning.” After the twentieth trial, the warning 
message read: “This is a game of chance. No skill is involved.” The last warning message appeared after 
the twenty-fifth trial and read: “You cannot predict whether you will win or lose.” Warning messages 
appeared on the feedback screen, above the feedback information. To make the warning messages salient, 
the messages were placed on a red octagon with white text (see Figure 2). The usual feedback information 






saw a prompt to press space to continue. Participants were asked to press space to continue during 
warning message trials to ensure they had enough time to view and read the message before moving on. 
Those in the no warnings groups did not receive these messages and played the BART uninterrupted. 
After completing the gambling task, participants completed the PANAS a second time to measure 
changes in affect levels after viewing the emotional stimuli and completing the BART. It was decided to 
place the second PANAS here instead of immediately after the film clip for several reasons. First, it was 
determined that it may be interesting to see if there were any changes in affect levels after the BART (i.e., 
if the BART itself affected affect levels), but there were concerns that having participants complete the 
PANAS three times (baseline levels, levels after the film clip, and levels after the BART) would cause 
participant fatigue. In addition, there were concerns that if participants completed the PANAS a second 
time prior to completing the BART, any effects of the affect manipulation may have worn off before 
participants started the BART. Based on previous studies that successfully induced positive and negative 
affect with the same film clips (Elices et al., 2012; Gartner & Bajbouj, 2014; Hinojosaa, Fernández-
Folgueirasa, Alberta, Santanielloa, Pozoa, & Capillac, 2017; Karsdorp, Ranson, Nijst, & Vlaeyen, 2012; 
Lalot, Delplanque, & Sander, 2014; Rennung & Gõritz, 2015; Schaefer et al., 2010), it was decided that 
the films were validated enough to justify not placing a PANAS scale directly after the film clip. As with 
the first round of the PANAS, two attention check questions were included, which prompted participants 
to press a specific number if they were paying attention.  
Once participants finished the PANAS, they completed the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking 
(DOSPERT) scale to measure risk-taking in five domains (financial, health/safety, recreational, ethical, 
and social). For this scale, participants rated the likelihood that they would engage in a wide variety of 
risky behaviors. As with the PANAS, two attention check questions were placed within the scale. These 
attention checks were worded differently to fit with the format of the DOSPERT questions. For example, 






After completion of the DOSPERT, participants were asked four demographic questions. 
Participants were first asked to enter their age (in years), and then their gender. Then participants were 
asked to indicate, with a yes or no response, whether they had ever been given a mental health diagnosis, 
and then whether they currently had a mental health diagnosis. Participants were not asked to elaborate on 
any mental health diagnoses. Demographic information was obtained with the intention of conducting 
exploratory analyses to see whether age, gender, or mental health accounted for any differences in 
performance on the BART or self-reported risk-taking on the DOSPERT. For example, individuals who 
have been given a diagnosis of bipolar disorder tend to engage in more risky behaviors than individuals 
who have not been given a diagnosis of bipolar disorder (Mason, O’Sullivan, Montaldi, Bentall, & El-
Deredy, 2014). Self-reported mental health was included in the demographics to ensure that mental health 
did not affect the results of the study.  
After all measurements were completed, the study was concluded by debriefing participants about 
the nature of the study. During the debriefing, all participants were led through a short breathing exercise 
shown to reduce negative affect (Ma et al., 2017). During this short exercise, participants engaged in 
diaphragmatic breathing. Participants were asked to inhale slowly and deeply, allowing their abdomen to 
expand. On exhale, the breath was slowly released, allowing the abdomen to contract. Participants were 
asked to take a few of these breaths at their own pace, and return to their normal breathing when ready. 
By leading participants through this exercise, we hoped to mitigate any lingering feelings of negative 
affect and return participants to their baseline mood levels. After completing the breathing exercise, 
participants were asked what they thought about the study and if they used any strategies throughout the 
study. Participants were also asked what they thought was being studied. This was asked to ensure no 
participants were aware of exactly what was being studied, which could have potentially affected their 
performance throughout the study. While some participants vaguely stated they believed the study was 
looking at mood, emotions, or gambling, no participant stated anything other than information that was 






suggest they had guessed the directionality of the hypotheses of the study. Therefore, no participants were 
removed from the analyses based on their answer to this question. Participants were then debriefed about 






























Affect Manipulation Check 
A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was used to ensure the two affect groups did not differ 
significantly on their baseline negative PANAS scores at the beginning of the experiment (See Table 1). 
There was not a significant difference in baseline negative affect PANAS scores for those in the negative 
affect condition (M = 1.74, SEM = .09) and those in the positive affect condition (M = 1.91, SEM = .11), t 
(98) = -1.27, p = .21. A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was also used to ensure that the two affect 
groups did not differ significantly on their baseline positive PANAS scores at the beginning of the 
experiment. There was not a significant difference in baseline positive affect PANAS scores for those in 
the negative affect condition (M = 3.31, SEM = .10) and those in the positive affect condition (M = 3.23, 
SEM = .09), t (98) = .62, p = .54. 
A PANAS change score was calculated for each participant on both the positive and negative 
PANAS scales. These scores were calculated by subtracting the positive affect score on the PANAS 2 
from the positive affect score from PANAS 1 for each participant and subtracting the negative affect 
score on the PANAS 2 from the negative affect score from PANAS 1 for each participant (See Table 2). 
A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was then used to determine whether there was a significant 
change in positive affect for either affect condition. The PANAS positive affect scale change score for 
those in the positive affect condition (M = -.05, SEM = .07) did not significantly differ from that for those 
in the negative affect condition (M = -.08, SEM = .09), t (98) = -.23, p = .82.  
A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was then used to determine whether there was a 
significant change in negative affect for either affect condition. The difference in the PANAS negative 
affect change score between the positive and negative affect conditions indicated a trend towards 
significance, in that those in the positive affect condition (M = -.22, SEM = .06) had a greater reduction in 






Warning Messages and Affect 
A 2x2 between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the effect of 
affect condition (positive or negative) and warning message condition (messages or no messages) on risk-
taking behavior, measured as the average number of pumps on trials that participants chose to stop 
pumping the balloon before it burst. For the main effect of affect, there was a trend towards a significant 
difference in risk-taking between those who were induced with negative affect (M = 28.66, SEM = 1.68) 
and those who were induced with positive affect (M = 24.80, SEM = 1.51), F(1, 99) = 2.89, p = .09, ηp2 = 
.03. The main effect of warning message condition was not significant F(1, 99) = .59, p = .44, ηp2 = .01, 
and those who received warning messages (M = 27.61, SEM = 1.55) did not differ from those who did not 
receive warning messages (M = 25.85, SEM = 1.68). There was no significant interaction effect detected 
between mood condition and warning message condition, F(1, 99) = .25, p = .62, ηp2 = .003, indicating no 
significant differences between the positive affect with warning messages (M = 26.24, SEM = 2.27), 
positive affect without warning messages (M = 23.36, SEM = 2.27), negative affect with warning 
messages (M = 28.98, SEM = 2.23), and negative affect without warning messages (M = 28.35, SEM = 
2.32) conditions (See Figure 3). 
DOSPERT and BART 
 Pearson’s r was used to determine whether there was a relationship between a behavioral 
measure of risk-taking (BART) and a self-reported measure of risk-taking (DOSPERT). The average 
number of pumps on the BART was negatively related to self-reported risk-taking on the social domain of 
the DOSPERT r (98) = -.22, p = .03. A higher average number of pumps on the BART was related to a 
lower self-reported risk-taking score on the DOSPERT social domain (See Figure 4). There was not a 
significant relationship between the average number of pumps on the BART and the DOSPERT financial 
domain r (98) = -.02, p = .84, ethical domain r (98) = -.08, p = .41, health/safety domain r (98) = -.12, p = 








Pearson’s r was used to analyze the relationship between age and risk-taking behavior on the 
BART, but no significant relationship was detected r (98) = -.01, p = .96 (See Table 3). Pearson’s r was 
also used to analyze the relationship between age and self-reported risk-taking behavior on the 
DOSPERT, but age was not related to self-reported risk-taking in the DOSPERT ethical domain r (98) = -
.11, p = .27, financial domain r (98) = -.18 p = .08, health/safety domain r (98) = -.06, p = .56, 
recreational domain r (98) = -.05, p = .60, social domain r (98) = -.06, p = .56, or overall DOSPERT score 
r (98) = -.11, p = .27 (See Table 3). 
Gender 
Previous research has demonstrated that there are often gender differences in risk-taking, with 
males typically exhibiting more risk-taking behavior than females (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; 
Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Harris, Jenkins, & Glaser, 2006). A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was 
used to analyze the difference between risk-taking behaviors on the BART based on gender. Male 
participants pumped the balloon more on average (M = 29.94, SEM = 2.10) than female participants (M = 
24.51, SEM = 1.20), t (98) = 2.40, p = .02 (See Figure 5). An ANOVA that built upon the above reported 
warning messages and affect analyses and included gender as an additional between-subjects factor 
revealed no significant interactions between gender and mood condition or warning message condition. 
A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was used to analyze the difference between self-reported 
risk-taking behaviors on the DOSPERT based on gender (See Figure 6). Men reported being more likely 
to take financial risks (M = 2.38, SEM = .10) than women (M = 1.97, SEM = .08), t (98) = 3.07, p = .003. 
In addition, women reported being more likely to take social risks (M = 3.80, SEM = .07) than men (M = 
3.47, SD = .08), t (98) = -3.07, p = .003. There was not a significant difference in participants’ overall 
DOSPERT scores t (98) = .19, p = .85, or their scores on the ethical domain t (98) = -.26, p = .80, 








 A total of 21 participants reported a mental health diagnosis (14 women, 7 men), and 17 
participants indicated that they currently have a mental health diagnosis (11 women, 6 men; See Table 1).  
A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was used to analyze the difference between self-reported 
mental health and risk-taking behavior on the BART. There was not a significant difference in the 
average number of pumps on the BART for those who have ever been given a mental health diagnosis (M 
= 24.71, SEM = 2.22) and those who have never been given a mental health diagnosis (M = 27.27, SEM = 
1.32), t (98) = -.92, p = .36. There was not a significant difference in risk-taking for those who currently 
have a mental health diagnosis (M = 23.23, SEM = 2.12) and those who do not currently have a mental 
health diagnosis (M = 27.45, SEM = 1.29), t (98) = -1.40, p = .17.  
Two-tailed, independent samples t-tests were used to analyze the difference between self-reported 
mental health (in terms of having ever received a mental health diagnosis) and self-reported risk-taking 
behavior on the DOSPERT (See Figure 7). Participants who reported that they have ever been given a 
mental health diagnosis reported being more likely to take health risks (M = 3.14, SEM = .14) than 
participants who have never been given a mental health diagnosis (M = 2.65, SEM = .08), t (98) = 2.98, p 
= .004. Participants who reported that they have ever been given a mental health diagnosis also reported 
being more likely to take social risks (M = 3.92, SEM = .13) than participants who have never been given 
a mental health diagnosis (M = 3.60, SEM = .06), t (98) = 2.39, p= .02.  There was a trend towards a 
significant difference in self-reported risk-taking on the ethical domain, in that participants who reported 
ever having a mental health diagnosis reported being slightly more likely to take ethical risks (M = 1.99, 
SEM = .14) than participants who have never been given a mental health diagnosis (M = 1.71, SEM = 
.06), t (98) = 1.96, p = .05. There was also a trend towards a significant difference in the overall 
DOSPERT scores, in that participants who reported ever having a mental health diagnosis reported being 
slightly more likely to take risks (M = 2.76, SEM = .08) than those who have never received a mental 






participants’ scores on the financial domain t (98) = -.42, p = .68, or recreational domain t (98) = -.26, p = 
.80 for those who have ever had a mental health diagnosis and those who have not. 
Two-tailed, independent samples t-tests were used to analyze the difference between self-reported 
mental health (in terms of currently having a mental health diagnosis) and self-reported risk-taking 
behavior on the DOSPERT (See Figure 8). Participants who reported that they currently have a mental 
health diagnosis reported being more likely to take social risks (M = 4.01, SEM = .14) than participants 
who did not currently have a mental health diagnosis (M = 3.59, SEM = .06), t (98) = 2.89, p = .005.  
There was a trend towards significance in self-reported risk-taking on the health/safety domain, in that 
those who reported that they currently have a mental health diagnosis indicated they were slightly more 
likely to take health/safety risks (M = 3.01, SEM = .14) than those who do not currently have a mental 
health diagnosis (M = 2.70, SEM = .08), t (98) = 1.74, p = .08. There was not a significant difference in 
participants’ overall DOSPERT scores t (98) = 1.18, p = .24, or their scores on the ethical domain t (98) = 
1.19, p = .24, financial domain t (98) = -.77, p = .44, or recreational domain t (98) = -.48, p = .64 for those 


















Hypothesis 1: Those induced with positive affect will display higher levels of risk-taking behavior 
than those who are induced with negative affect. 
Hypothesis 1 was not supported by the results of this study. It was hypothesized that those 
induced with positive affect would rely on System 1 thinking and display higher levels of risk-taking than 
those induced with negative affect, who would rely more heavily on System 2 thinking. However, those 
induced with negative affect actually displayed slightly higher levels of risk-taking than those induced 
with positive affect, which was the opposite of the predicted results. However, the difference in the 
average number of pumps on the BART (i.e., level of risk-taking) between the two groups was not 
statistically significant. Though participants induced with negative affect had a higher average number of 
pumps on the BART than participants induced with positive affect, the two groups did not perform 
differently enough on the behavioral measure (i.e., the BART) to warrant any significant findings. 
The directionality of these results could potentially be explained by the Mood Maintenance 
Hypothesis, which suggests that those in a positive mood tend to be more risk-aversive than those in a 
negative mood because they want to maintain their good mood, and feel that they have more to lose than 
those in a negative mood (Isen & Patrick, 1983). If the affect manipulation was successful in inducing 
positive affect, it is possible that participants in the positive affect conditions pumped the balloon less 
because the idea of losing points would hurt their positive affective state. Therefore, participants in the 
positive affect condition may have been more cautious in an attempt to preserve their good mood. On the 
other hand, those in a negative mood tend to be more risk-seeking as an attempt to change their mood 
(e.g., winning on a gamble would improve their mood), and because they feel that they have less to lose 
than those in a positive mood. If the affect manipulation was effective in inducing negative affect, it is 
possible participants in the negative affect conditions were attempting to repair their mood by pumping 






amount of points. It is possible that obtaining a high amount of points was perceived as something good 
that would improve their mood. On the other hand, pumping the balloon more also lead to an increased 
risk of bursting the balloon and losing all the points accumulated on that round. It is possible that the 
chance of bursting the balloon and losing points was worth the risk to those in the negative affect 
condition because they were already in a negative mood. However, this is stated cautiously because the 
difference between the positive affect and negative affect groups was not statistically significant, and 
these results cannot be considered in support of the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis. For example, it is 
possible that the directionality of the results is simply due to the affect manipulation not producing the 
intended results. The PANAS change scores indicated that there was no significant increase in positive 
affect for those in the positive affect conditions. If the film clip had been effective in inducing positive 
affect, it would have been expected to see an increase in positive affect for these groups. Though there 
was a slight reduction in negative affect for those in the positive affect conditions, the difference was not 
quite statistically significant. The PANAS change scores indicated that there was no significant increase 
in negative affect for those in the negative affect conditions. If the film clip had been effective in inducing 
negative affect, it would have been expected to see an increase in negative affect for these groups. If it 
cannot be verified that the positive affect group displayed higher levels of positive affect than the negative 
affect group and the negative affect group displayed higher levels of negative affect than the positive 
affect group, the directionality of the results cannot truly be attributed to affect levels.  
Based on these results, participants induced with negative affect most likely did not rely more 
heavily on System 2 thinking than those induced with positive affect as was predicted. If they had, the 
results should have demonstrated that participants in the negative affect condition were more risk-averse. 
However, it is not possible to determine the exact cause of why participants induced with negative affect 
were not more risk-averse. The predicted results may not have been found due to the fact that the affect 







Hypothesis 2a: Those in the positive affect with warning messages condition will not differ in levels 
of risk-taking behavior from the positive affect with no warning messages condition. 
Hypothesis 2a was partially supported by the results, as there was not a significant difference in 
risk-taking behavior between the positive affect with warning messages condition and the positive affect 
without warning messages condition. However, as there were no significant differences between any of 
the four conditions in the study, it cannot truly be concluded that the hypothesis was supported in the way 
outlined by the logic of the study. In other words, because no significant effects of the warning messages 
were found and no significant changes in affect levels were detected, it cannot be concluded that the 
positive affect with warning messages condition and the positive affect without warning messages 
condition did not differ in a statistically significant way because positive affect increased reliance on 
System 1 thinking and decreased reliance on System 2 thinking. Therefore, though the two conditions did 
not differ significantly, it was most likely not due to the predicted interaction effect between positive 
affect and warning messages. 
In addition, the participants in the positive affect with warning messages condition pumped the 
balloon slightly more on average than the participants in the positive affect without warnings messages 
condition, though the difference between the groups was not statistically significant. However, it is 
interesting that those who received warning messages pumped the balloon slightly more than those who 
did not, as the warning messages were intended to reduce risky behavior.  
Hypothesis 2b: Those in the negative affect with warning messages condition will display lower 
levels of risk-taking than those in all other conditions.  
Hypothesis 2b was not supported by the results of this study. It was hypothesized that negative 
affect and the warning messages would interact to decrease risk-taking more than in the other three 
conditions because negative affect and the warning messages would both increase reliance on System 2 
thinking. If participants were relying on System 2 thinking, they should have displayed lower levels of 






significant, participants in both negative affect conditions displayed higher levels of risk-taking than those 
in both positive affect conditions. In addition, there was virtually no difference in levels of risk-taking 
between the negative affect with warning messages and negative affect without warning messages 
conditions. 
It is possible that the negative affect manipulation did not produce the intended effects, which 
could explain why decreased risk-taking was not seen in those induced with negative affect. The mean 
PANAS score for negative affect changed very little from the first to the second PANAS for those in the 
negative affect conditions, which indicated that the negative affect film clip may not have been effective. 
If participants in the negative affect conditions were not experiencing negative affect as intended, it is 
possible that they were not relying on System 2 thinking. This could explain why those in these 
conditions exhibited slightly more risk-taking behavior. 
In addition, the warning messages produced no change in behavior, in either direction, for those 
induced with negative affect. The warning messages followed guidelines laid out by previous research 
that should have helped increase their effectiveness- the messages contained information aimed to correct 
gambling related cognitive biases, appeared between trials, and required participants to interact with the 
message (by pressing “space”) to continue (Ginley et al., 2017). The warning messages should have 
caused participants to rely more heavily on System 2 thinking, which should have made them more 
cautious and risk-averse than participants who did not receive the warning messages. It was expected that 
these messages would help participants recognize flawed thinking (due to cognitive biases), and cause 
increased activation of System 2 thinking. Though they were intended to help reduce risky behavior, the 
warning messages were ineffective. 
PANAS Change Scores 
PANAS change scores were calculated for those induced with positive affect and those induced 
with negative affect to see if the affect level of each group changed in the intended direction. It was 






affect than those induced with negative affect. The PANAS change scores indicated that those induced 
with positive affect reported slightly lower levels of negative affect on the second PANAS, but they also 
reported slightly lower levels of positive affect on the second scale. The reduction in negative affect was 
greater than the reduction in positive affect; however, neither the PANAS change score for positive affect 
or the PANAS change score for negative affect for those induced with positive affect reached statistical 
significance. It was also predicted that those induced with negative affect would have a higher PANAS 
change score for negative affect than those induced with positive affect. Neither the PANAS change score 
for positive affect or the PANAS change score for negative affect for those induced with negative affect 
was statistically significant.  
Though the scores did change slightly for each group by the second PANAS, the change was not 
different enough to warrant any significant findings. The PANAS change scores and the means for each 
group from PANAS time 1 and PANAS time 2 suggest that participants either remained around their 
baseline affect levels throughout the study, or they returned to their baseline affect levels prior to 
completing the second PANAS. This could be due to the affect manipulation not having the intended 
effects, the affect manipulation not producing long-lasting effects, or the BART interfering with the 
effects of the affect manipulation. For example, the Dead Poet’s Society film clip may not have been 
effective in inducing positive affect, which could explain why there was not a significant change in 
positive affect for those who viewed this film clip. However, the positive affect conditions did display a 
slight reduction in negative affect, which could suggest that the film clip’s effects may simply have worn 
off by the time the PANAS was administered for a second time. The effects may have just faded with 
time, or it is possible that the BART introduced different emotions that interfered with the effects of the 
affect manipulation. It is also possible that the Misery film clip was not effective in inducing negative 
affect, which could explain why there was not a significant change in negative affect for those who 
viewed this film clip. Once again, it is also possible that the BART interfered with the effects of the affect 






conditions and the slight reduction of negative affect (which could potentially indicate the film clip may 
have had some of the desired effects), there was no reduction of positive affect for those in the negative 
affect conditions. 
DOSPERT and BART 
The BART has been shown to be correlated with traits of impulsivity and sensation-seeking and 
self-reported risk-taking in terms of gambling, substance use (alcohol, cigarettes, and other drugs), 
unprotected sex, theft, and not wearing a seatbelt (Lejuez et al., 2002). In addition, studies have found that 
participants’ score on the DOSPERT was related to their performance on the BART (Lorian & Grisham, 
2010; Pietruska & Armony, 2013). However, the current study did not find any correlations between the 
BART and the DOSPERT, with the exception of the social domain. 
Performance on the BART was negatively related to participants’ score on the DOSPERT social 
domain. A higher score on the social domain (i.e., greater self-reported likelihood of engaging in risky 
social behaviors) was related to a lower number of average pumps on the BART (i.e., lower levels of risk-
taking behavior), while a lower score on the social domain was related to a higher number of average 
pumps on the BART. Gender could be a potential explanation of this result, as men had a higher average 
score on the BART than women, but women had a higher average score on the DOSPERT social domain 
than males. Thus, this could possibly explain the negative relationship between the two variables.   
Gender 
The current study found that men exhibited a higher level of risk-taking behavior than women, as 
evidenced by men pumping the balloon more on average than women during the BART trials. This is 
consistent with previous literature, which suggests that men often take risks more than women (Byrnes et 
al, 1999; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Harris et al, 2006), though this may depend on the type of risk (Byrnes 
et al, 1999; Figner & Weber, 2011).  
The current study detected significant differences between men and women on the social and 






Weber, 2011; Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, & Liu, 2013). Men indicated that they would be more likely to 
take financial risks than women. This relates to existing research which has demonstrated that men were 
more likely to take financial risks than women (Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Xie et al, 2017). Men have 
shown that they perceive financial risks as less risky than women, which potentially explains why men 
are more likely to take financial risks (Figner & Weber, 2011). This result is also consistent with the 
finding that men displayed higher levels of risk-taking than women on the BART in the current study. On 
the other hand, women indicated that they were more likely to engage in social risks. Women have 
demonstrated that they view social risks as less risky than men, which potentially explains why women 
are more willing to engage in this type of risky behavior (Figner & Weber, 2011). Byrnes et al (1999) 
conducted a meta-analysis that found that gender differences in risk-taking often vary by context, 
meaning that men may be more likely to take risks than women in certain contexts/situations and women 
may be more likely to take risks than men in other contexts/situations than males. In their meta-analysis, 
men were more likely to take gambling risks than women, which is in line with men having an increased 
score on the DOSPERT financial domain in the current study. 
Mental Health 
Participants who indicated that they have, at some point in their life, been given a mental health 
diagnosis had higher scores on the DOSPERT health/safety domain. Therefore, these participants 
indicated that they would be more likely to engage in behaviors that pose a risk to their health and/or 
safety than participants who indicated that they have not ever been given a mental health diagnosis. 
Individuals who had been given a mental health diagnosis at some point in their life were found to be 
more likely to smoke cigarettes than individuals who had never received a mental health diagnosis 
(Lasser, Boyd, Woolhandler, Himmelstein, McCormick, & Bor, 2000). In addition, a diagnosis of ADHD 
has shown to be related to higher levels of substance abuse (Lee, Humphreys, Flory, Liu, & Glass, 2011) 
and risky sexual behavior (Sarver, McCart, Sheidow, & Letourneau, 2014), while a diagnosis of 






likelihood of not adhering to medical treatment (DiMatteo, Lepper, & Croghan, 2000). These behaviors 
all fall under the health/safety risk category. However, participants were only asked whether they had 
ever been given a mental health diagnosis and were not asked to specify and/or elaborate on their 
diagnoses in the current study. 
Participants who have ever been given a mental health diagnosis also had higher score on the 
DOSPERT social domain, meaning that these participants indicated they would be more likely to engage 
in social risks than those who have never been given a mental health diagnosis. However, it should be 
pointed out that in the current study, only a small number of participants reported ever having a mental 
health diagnosis, and the majority of those participants were female. Therefore, it is possible that the 
reason ever having a mental health diagnosis was related to a higher likelihood of engaging in social risks 
was because the majority of participants in that particular analysis were female. As demonstrated when 
gender was analyzed, females indicated that they were more likely to engage in social risks than males. 
This could also be the reason that those who currently have a mental health diagnosis also had a higher 
score on the DOSPERT social domain than those who do not currently have a mental health diagnosis. 
Once again, only a small number of participants fell into this category, and the majority of them were 
female. 
General Discussion 
Affect did not significantly affect risk-taking behavior. It was expected that positive affect would 
lead to increased level of risk-taking; however, this effect was not observed. It is possible that the positive 
affect manipulation was not strong enough to place the participants in a state of cognitive ease, which 
should have increased their reliance on System 1 thinking. System 1 thinking is fast, intuitive, and 
requires very little cognitive effort. As such, System 1 thinking can be prone to errors and cognitive 
biases. When relying on System 1 thinking, risky behavior is often increased. Therefore, if participants 
induced with positive affect were relying on System 1 thinking, they should have demonstrated higher 






risky behavior; however, this was not observed either. It is possible that the negative affect manipulation 
was not strong enough to place the participants in a state of cognitive strain, which should have increased 
reliance on System 2 thinking. System 2 is slow, deliberative, and requires cognitive effort. As such, 
System 2 is much less prone to errors than System 1, and System 2 is often associated with less risk-
taking behavior. If participants induced with negative affect were relying on System 2 thinking, they 
should have exhibited lower levels of risk-taking behavior than those induced with negative affect. 
However, participants induced with negative affect displayed slightly higher levels of risk-taking than 
those induced with positive affect, though the difference was not statistically significant. It is not possible 
to attribute the slight increase in risk-taking behavior to negative affect, as the effects of the affect 
manipulation were unable to be verified. 
Warning messages did not significantly affect risk-taking behavior. It was expected that 
participants who received warning messages would display lower levels of risk-taking than participants 
who did not receive warning messages. It is common to experience cognitive biases (e.g., illusion of 
control, gambler’s fallacy), which stem from System 1, when gambling. It was expected that displaying 
warning messages aimed to correct those cognitive biases would help increase reliance on System 2 
thinking, which would in turn cause participants to be more cautious and take less risks. However, this 
was not the case as warning messages were not effective at reducing risky behavior. Participants who 
received warning messages most likely did not rely more heavily on System 2 thinking than those who 
did not receive warning messages. 
Affect and warning messages did not interact to affect risk-taking behavior. It was expected that 
participants in the positive affect with warning messages condition would not differ significantly in terms 
of risk-taking behavior from those in the positive affect without warning messages condition. While the 
two groups technically did not differ in levels of risk-taking, it cannot be verified that the reason they did 
not differ was due to an interaction between affect and warning messages. It was hypothesized that the 






positive affect manipulation would overpower the effects of the warning messages. In other words, it was 
expected that the feelings of positive affect would cause an increased reliance on System 1 thinking for 
participants in both conditions. Due to the increased reliance on System 1 from the positive affect and the 
fact that System 2 has limited resources and often chooses to preserve those resources, the warning 
messages would not be effective at activating System 2 thinking. As warning messages did not have an 
effect on risk-taking behavior in any condition and the effects of the affect manipulation cannot be 
verified, it is likely that these results do not support the expected interaction effect. It should be noted that 
those in the positive affect with warning messages displayed slightly higher levels of risk-taking on the 
BART than those in the positive affect without warning messages condition, though the difference was 
not statistically significant.   
It was also expected that an interaction effect would be observed between negative affect and 
warning messages. Negative affect was expected to increase reliance on System 2 thinking and thus 
decrease risk-taking behavior, and warning messages were also expected to decrease risk-taking behavior. 
Therefore, it was hypothesized that those in the negative affect with warning messages condition would 
display the lowest levels of risk-taking compared to the other conditions. However, group mean BART 
score for the negative affect with warning messages condition and the negative affect without warnings 
messages condition was almost the same. This indicates that the warning messages did not have an effect 
on participants’ risk-taking behavior. In addition, both negative affect conditions had slightly higher 
scores on the BART than the positive affect conditions. Therefore, it is likely that neither the negative 
affect or the warning messages caused participants in the negative affect with warning messages condition 
to rely more heavily on System 2 thinking. If participants relied on System 2 thinking, lower levels of 
risk-taking should have been observed. 
As the effects of the affect manipulation cannot be verified, it cannot be concluded whether affect 
has an effect on gambling warning messages. Therefore, future research in this area may still be 






manipulation was not effective, the effects of the affect manipulation did not last long enough, or the 
BART interfered with the effects of the affect manipulation. It is also possible that the hypotheses were 
not supported due to an alternate explanation, such as the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis. Future research 
would want to verify that the affect manipulation had the intended effect in order to rule out any alternate 
explanations. In addition, the warning messages were not effective. This may suggest that further research 
should be conducted to attempt to increase the effectiveness of gambling warning messages for various 
populations and across various settings. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Affect Manipulation. Though the film clips used in this study have been shown to be effective for 
inducing positive and negative affect in other studies (Elices et al., 2012; Gartner & Bajbouj, 2014; 
Hinojosaa et al., 2017; Karsdorp et al., 2012; Lalot et al., 2014; Rennung & Gõritz, 2015; Schaefer et al., 
2010), no change in affect levels were detected in the current study. There are many potential reasons for 
why the affect manipulation was not effective in this study. 
Both film clips targeted specific positive or negative emotions. The Misery film clip targeted fear, 
while the Dead Poet’s Society film clip targeted tenderness (Schaefer et al., 2010). Perhaps future 
research could try to use film clips that target more general feelings of positive and negative affect, 
instead of film clips that target specific emotions. 
In addition, it is possible the chosen film clips were not sufficient to produce the intended effects 
for the particular participants in the study. For instance, during the debriefing four participants indicated 
that they enjoyed watching the Misery film clip, and two participants indicated that they found the film 
clip to be funny. Though only a small number of participants explicitly stated that they found the film 
enjoyable or funny, enjoyment and amusement were certainly not the intended effects of the film. 
In the Misery film clip, a female character is preparing to use a sledgehammer break the ankles of 
a man she is holding hostage. The decision was made to cut the film clip off as the woman prepares to 






included in previous studies that successfully used the clip, it was not used in the current study due to 
concerns that the ankle breaking scene would be too upsetting for participants. Therefore, in an attempt to 
minimize harm to participants, that part of the film was not shown. However, perhaps the film clip would 
have been more effective in inducing negative affect if the entire film clip was played. It is possible that 
viewing the ankle breaking part of the film clip contributed to the feelings of negative affect that were 
found in previous studies. 
It is also possible that the effect of the affect manipulation simply wore off by the time 
participants took the PANAS for the second time. Perhaps the study could have benefited from placing 
the PANAS immediately after the film clip to verify whether or not the intended affect was induced. 
However, as previously addressed, placing the PANAS after the film clip would have presented other 
concerns (e.g., fatigue after completing the PANAS three times, effects wearing off before participants 
started the BART).  
The BART itself could have potentially influenced participant’s mood. During the debriefing, 
seven participants indicated that the BART was boring, and four participants found the BART to be 
stressful and/or frustrating. It is possible that the BART could have mitigated any affective effects of the 
movie clips, which could potentially explain why participants essentially returned to baseline affect levels 
by the time they completed the second PANAS scale.  
The last potential limitation for the affect manipulation could be that participants were possibly 
given too much information about the study prior to the study’s completion. For example, the study’s title 
was listed on the Georgia Southern SONA system, which participants used to sign up for the study, as 
“Induced Moods, Warning Messages, and Gambling Behavior.” While the title does not imply any 
directionality as far as the hypotheses, it certainly gives the main gist of the experiment away. In addition, 
the same study name was listed on the informed consent document. It is very possible that participants 






Warning Messages. The warning messages were also not effective in this study. It is possible that 
the messages were not salient enough. Though the messages appeared on a bright red stop sign in the 
middle of the feedback screen, it is possible that was not enough to capture participants’ attention. 
Perhaps it would have been more effective if the warning messages took up a larger portion of the screen 
to make them even more noticeable.  
It is also possible that participants realized after the first warning message that they just needed to 
press “space” to continue. If this was the case, it is possible that participants were not actually attending to 
the messages, and simply pressing “space” to move on. The study was designed to have participants press 
“space” to ensure they were given enough time to read the message, and so participants who read faster 
did not have to wait for a long period between trials. However, perhaps future research could benefit from 
displaying the warning messages for a set duration. 
As the BART was only thirty trials, and the warning messages were set to appear every five trials, 
participants were only exposed to five warning messages throughout the study. In addition, participants 
only saw each message once. There is a possibility that participants were simply not given enough 
exposure to the warning messages for them to effectively alter behavior. Previous research has 
demonstrated that warning messages need to appear between trials to be effective (Ginley et al., 2017), 
but has not focused on whether a certain frequency of warning messages is most effective. Future 
research could focus on testing different frequencies of warning messages to determine if this influences 
the effectiveness of the messages. 
It could also be possible that certain warning messages may have been more effective in reducing 
gambling behavior than others. If participants saw the same warning message every five trials, perhaps 
the increased repetition and exposure to the same message could have made it more effective. In addition, 
if the same message was used each trial it could be determined whether that particular message was 
effective in reducing risky behavior or not. The current study was modeled after previous studies which 






Wulfert, 2012). However, perhaps future research could benefit from testing one specific message at a 
time to determine which warning messages are effective and which ones are not. Then researchers could 
use the warning messages that were demonstrated to be effective in reducing gambling behavior in future 
research. 
The last potential limitation for the warning messages could be the chosen behavioral measure, 
the BART. Though the participants had a chance to win or lose points during the task, there was no 
monetary value associated with the points. Participants therefore may not have felt like that had much to 
win or lose during the task. The BART was chosen because it is a validated measure of risk-taking 
behavior and performance on the BART has been shown to be positively correlated with self-reported 
gambling behavior (Wallsten et al., 2005). However, there was not a significant correlation found 
between performance on the BART and self-reported financial risk-taking in the current study. Therefore, 
it is possible the BART was not the best measure of gambling behavior for the current sample. 
Sampling Issues. It is possible that the current sample size was not large enough to detect any 
significant effects. The current sample size allowed for twenty-five participants per condition. Some 
researchers argue that a minimum of fifty participants per condition is necessary to detect significant 
effects (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013). However, the current sample size was selected based on 
a power analysis conducted prior to data collection, which concluded that a minimum of sixty-six 
participants should have been enough to detect any significant effects. In addition, data collection for this 
study occurred at the end of the spring semester. It is possible that not all participants gave their full 
attention to the study due to the end of the semester approaching. Therefore, the current sample of 
undergraduate students may not have been ideal for detecting the effects of this study. In addition, future 
research may benefit from using a sample of current gamblers to test these effects. 
In conclusion, more research needs to be conducted to conclude if gambling warning messages 
are a viable option for reducing gambling behavior. Future research should attempt to identify an effective 






effectiveness. It may be beneficial to examine these effects on a population of current gamblers. In 
addition, future research should continue to examine warning messages in the context of positive and 
negative affect. Future researchers should ensure they can effectively induce participants with positive or 
negative affect, and that the effects of the affect manipulation last long enough for participants to 
complete the study. Exploring these avenues will help strengthen the literature on gambling warning 


























American Psychiatric Association. (2013). DSM-5 fact sheets. Retrieved from 
https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-fact-sheets 
Appelhans, B. M., Whited, M. C., Schneider, K. L., Ma, Y., Oleski, J. L., Merriam, P. A., Waring, M. E., 
Olendzki, B. C., Mann, D. M., Ockene, I. S., & Pagoto, S. L. (2012). Depression severity, diet 
quality, and physical activity in women with obesity and depression. Journal of the Academy of 
Nutrition and Dietetics, 112(5), 693-698. doi:10.1016/j.jand.2012.02.006 
Auer, M., Malischnig, D., & Griffiths, M.D. 2014. Is “pop-up” messaging in online slot machine 
gambling effective as a responsible gambling strategy? Journal of Gambling Issues. 29:1–10. 
Benhsain, K., Taillefer, A., & Ladouceur, R. (2004). Awareness of independence of events and erroneous 
perceptions while gambling. Addictive Behaviors, 29(2), 399-404. 
doi:10.1016/j.addbeh.2003.08.011 
Blaszczynski, A., Cowley, E., Anthony, C., & Hinsley, K. (2016). Breaks in play: Do they achieve 
intended aims? Journal of Gambling Studies, 32(2), 789-800. doi:10.1007/s10899-015-9565-7 
Blaszczynski, A., Ladouceur, R., & Shaffer, H. J. (2004). A science-based framework for responsible 
gambling: The reno model. Journal of Gambling Studies, 20(3), 301-317. 
doi:10.1023/b:jogs.0000040281.49444.e2 
Boyer, T. (2006). The development of risk-taking: A multi-perspective review. Developmental Review, 
26(3), 291-345. doi:10.1016/j.dr.2006.05.002  
Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., & Schafer, W. D. (1999). Gender differences in risk taking: A meta-analysis. 
Psychological Bulletin, 125(3), 367-383. doi:10.1037//0033-2909.125.3.367 
Charness, G., & Gneezy, U. (2012). Strong evidence for gender differences in risk taking. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 83(1), 50-58. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.007 
Clore, G. L., Gasper, K., & Garvin, E. (2001).  Affect as information.  In J. P. Forgas, (Ed.).  Handbook of 






Cloutier, M., Ladouceur, R., & Sévigny, S. (2006). Responsible gambling tools: Pop-up messages and 
pauses on video lottery terminals. Journal of Psychology, 140(5), 434-438. 
Crawford, J. R., & Henry, J. D. (2004). The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS): Construct 
validity, measurement properties and normative data in a large non-clinical sample. British 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43(3), 245-265. doi:10.1348/0144665031752934 
Croskerry, P. (2003). Cognitive forcing strategies in clinical decisionmaking. Annals of Emergency 
Medicine, 41(1), 110-120. doi:10.1067/mem.2003.22 
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic Literature, 47, 
448–474. doi:10.1257/jel.47.2.448 
Cummins, L. F., Nadorff, M. R., & Kelly, A. E. (2009). Winning and positive affect can lead to reckless 
gambling. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 23(2), 287-294. doi:10.1037/a0014783 
Devine, P. G., Forscher, P. S., Austin, A. J., & Cox, W. T. (2012). Long-term reduction in implicit race 
bias: A prejudice habit-breaking intervention. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(6), 
1267-1278. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2012.06.003 
Dimatteo, M. R., Lepper, H. S., & Croghan, T. W. (2000). Depression Is a risk factor for noncompliance 
with medical treatment. Archives of Internal Medicine, 160(14), 2101. 
doi:10.1001/archinte.160.14.2101 
Dixon, M. R. (2000). Manipulating the illusion of control: Variations in gambling as a function of 
perceived control over chance outcomes. The Psychological Record, 50(4), 705-719. 
doi:10.1007/bf03395379 
Elices, M., Soler, J., Fernández, C., Martín-Blanco, A., Portella, M., Pérez, V., Álvarez, E., & Pascual, J. 
(2012). Physiological and self-assessed emotional responses to emotion-eliciting films in 







Emond, M. S., & Marmurek, H. C. (2010). Gambling related cognitions mediate the association between 
thinking style and problem gambling severity. Journal of Gambling Studies, 26(2), 257-267. 
doi:10.1007/s10899-009-9164-6 
Figner, B., & Weber, E. (2011). Who takes risks when and why? determinants of risk taking. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 20(4), 211-216. doi:10.1177/0963721411415790 
Fiske, S. T. (1980). Attention and weight in person perception: The impact of negative and extreme 
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38(6), 889-906. doi:10.1037//0022-
3514.38.6.889 
Floyd, K., Whelan, J. P., & Meyers, A. W. (2006). Use of warning messages to modify gambling beliefs 
and behavior in a laboratory investigation. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 20(1), 69-74. 
doi:10.1037/0893-164X.20.1.69 
Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM). Psychological Bulletin, 
117(1), 39-66. doi:10.1037//0033-2909.117.1.39 
Gärtner, M., & Bajbouj, M. (2014). Encoding-related EEG oscillations during memory formation are 
modulated by mood state. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9(12), 1934-1941. 
doi:10.1093/scan/nst184 
Ginley, M., Whelan, J., Pfund, R., Peter, S. & Meyers, A. (2017). Warning messages for electronic 
gambling machines: evidence for regulatory policies. Addiction Research & Theory, 1-10. doi: 
10.1080/16066359.2017.1321740 
Gobet, F. R. & Schiller, M. R. (2011). A manifesto for cognitive models of problem gambling. European 
Perspectives on Cognitive Science.  
Grable, J. E., & Roszkowski, M. J. (2008). The influence of mood on the willingness to take financial 






Harris, C., & Jenkins-Guarnieri, M. (2006.). Gender differences in risk assessment: Why do women take 
fewer risks than men? Judgement and Decision Making, 1(1), 48-63. doi:10.1037/e511092014-
212 
Hinojosa, J., Fernández-Folgueiras, U., Albert, J., Santaniello, G., Pozo, M., & Capilla, A. (2017). 
Negative induced mood influences word production: An event-related potentials study with a 
covert picture naming task. Neuropsychologia, 95, 227-239. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2016.12.025 
Hodgins, D. C., & el-Guebaly, N. (2004). Retrospective and prospective reports of precipitants to relapse 
in pathological gambling. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 72(1), 72-80. 
doi:10.1037/0022-006X.72.1.72 
Holub, A., Hodgins, D. C., & Peden, N. E. (2005). Development of the temptations for gambling 
questionnaire: A measure of temptation in recently quit gamblers. Addiction Research & Theory, 
13(2), 179-191. doi:10.1080/16066350412331314902 
Holroyd, J. (2015). Implicit bias, awareness and imperfect cognitions. Consciousness and Cognition, 33, 
511-523. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.024 
Isen, A. M., & Patrick, R. (1983). The effect of positive feelings on risk taking: When the chips are down. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 31(2), 194-202. doi:10.1016/0030-
5073(83)90120-4 
Jackson, S., Hillard, A. a., & Schneider, T. (2014). Using implicit bias training to improve attitudes 
toward women in STEM. Social Psychology of Education, 17(3), 419-438. doi: 10.1007/s11218-
014-9259-5 
Jardin, B., & Wulfert, E. (2009). The use of messages in altering risky gambling behavior in college 







Jardin, B. F., & Wulfert, E. (2012). The use of messages in altering risky gambling behavior in 
experienced gamblers. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 26(1), 166-170. doi:10.1037/a0026202 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow (1st ed.). New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 
Karsdorp, P. A., Ranson, S., Nijist, S., & Vlaeyen, J. (2012). Goals, mood and cognitive task performance 
during experimentally induced mechanical pressure pain. Journal of Behavior Therapy and 
Experimental Psychiatry, 44(2), 240-247. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2012.07.009 
Ladouceur, R., & Walker, M. (1996). A cognitive perspective on gambling. In P. M. Salkovskis (Ed.), 
Trends in cognitive and behavioural therapies, (pp. 89-120). New York: Wiley. 
Lalot, F., Delplanque, S., & Sander, D. (2014). Mindful regulation of positive emotions: A comparison 
with reappraisal and expressive suppression. Frontiers in Psychology, 5. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00243 
Lasser, K., Boyd, J. W., Woolhandler, S., Himmelstein, D. U., Mccormick, D., & Bor, D. H. (2000). 
Smoking and mental illness. JAMA, 284(20), 2606-2610. doi:10.1001/jama.284.20.2606 
Lee, S. S., Humphreys, K. L., Flory, K., Liu, R., & Glass, K. (2011). Prospective association of childhood 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and substance use and abuse/dependence: A 
meta-analytic review. Clinical Psychology Review, 31(3), 328-341. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2011.01.006 
Lejuez, C. W., Read, J. P., Kahler, C. W., Richards, J. B., Ramsey, S. E., Stuart, G. L., Strong, D. R., & 
Brown, R. A. (2002). Evaluation of a behavioral measure of risk-taking: The Balloon Analogue 
Risk Task (BART). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8, 75-84. 
Lench, H. C., Flores, S. A., & Bench, S. W. (2011). Discrete emotions predict changes in cognition, 
judgment, experience, behavior, and physiology: A meta-analysis of experimental emotion 
elicitations. Psychological Bulletin, 137(5), 834-855. doi:10.1037/a0024244 
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on 






Lorian, C. N., & Grisham, J. R. (2010). The safety bias: Risk-avoidance and social anxiety pathology. 
Behaviour Change, 27(01), 29-41. doi:10.1375/bech.27.1.29 
Ma, X., Yue, Z., Gong, Z., Zhang, H., Duan, N., Shi, Y., Wei, G., & Li, Y. (2017). The effect of 
diaphragmatic breathing on attention, negative affect and stress in healthy adults. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 8. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00874 
Macrae, C. N., Milne, A. B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (1994). Stereotypes as energy-saving devices: A peek 
inside the cognitive toolbox. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66(1), 37-47. 
doi:10.1037//0022-3514.66.1.37 
Marmurek, H., Switzer, J., & D'Alvise, J. (2015). Impulsivity, gambling cognitions, and the gambler's 
fallacy in university students. Journal of Gambling Studies, 31(1), 197-210. doi:10.1007/s10899-
013-9421-6 
Mason, L., O’Sullivan, N., Montaldi, D., Bentall, R. P., & El-Deredy, W. (2014). Decision-making and 
trait impulsivity in bipolar disorder are associated with reduced prefrontal regulation of striatal 
reward valuation. Brain, 137(8), 2346-2355. doi:10.1093/brain/awu152 
May, R. K., Whelan, J. P., Meyers, A. W., & Steenbergh, T. A. (2005). Gambling-related irrational 
beliefs in the maintenance and modification of gambling behaviour. International Gambling 
Studies, 5(2), 155-167. doi:10.1080/14459790500303147 
Mccusker, C. G., & Gettings, B. (1997). Automaticity of cognitive biases in addictive behaviours: Further 
evidence with gamblers. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 36(4), 543-554. 
doi:10.1111/j.2044-8260.1997.tb01259.x 
Monaghan, S., & Blaszczynski, A. (2010). Impact of mode of display and message content of responsible 
gambling signs for electronic gaming machines on regular gamblers. Journal of Gambling 






Monaghan, S., Blaszczynski, A., & Nower, L. (2009). Do warning signs on electronic gaming machines 
influence irrational cognitions? Psychological Reports, 105(1), pp.173-187. doi: 
10.2466/pr0.105.1.173-187 
National Council on Problem Gambling. (2016). Survey of problem gambling services in the United 
States executive summary. Retrieved from http://www.ncpgambling.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/2016-PG-Services-Survey-Executive-Summary-V5.1.pdf 
Otto, A. R., Fleming, S. M., & Glimcher, P. W. (2016). Unexpected but incidental positive outcomes 
predict real-world gambling. Psychological Science, 27(3), 299-311. 
doi:10.1177/0956797615618366 
Palmer du Preez, K., Landon, J., Bellringer, M., Garrett, N., & Abbott, M. (2016). The effects of pop-up 
harm minimisation messages on electronic gaming machine gambling behaviour in New Zealand. 
Journal of Gambling Studies, 32(4), 1115-1126. doi:10.1007/s10899-016-9603-0 
Pelletier, M., & Ladouceur, R. (2007). The effect of knowledge of mathematics on gambling behaviours 
and erroneous perceptions. International Journal of Psychology, 42(2), 134-140. 
doi:10.1080/00207590600788047 
Pietruska, K., & Armony, J. L. (2013). Differential effects of trait anger on optimism and risk behaviour. 
Cognition & Emotion, 27(2), 318-325. doi:10.1080/02699931.2012.703130 
Research Institute on Addictions. (2012). RIA expert summary: Gambling. Retrieved from 
http://www.buffalo.edu/ria/news_events/es/es3.html. 
Reyna, V. F., & Farley, F. (2006). Risk and rationality in adolescent decision making: Implications for 
theory, practice, and public policy. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 7(1), 1-44. 
doi:10.1111/j.1529-1006.2006.00026 
Rolison, J. J., Hanoch, Y., Wood, S., & Liu, P. (2013). Risk-taking differences across the adult life span: 







Rottenberg, J., Ray, R. D., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Emotion elicitation using films. In Handbook of Emotion 
Elicitation and Assessment (pp. 9-28). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sarver, D. E., Mccart, M. R., Sheidow, A. J., & Letourneau, E. J. (2014). ADHD and risky sexual 
behavior in adolescents: Conduct problems and substance use as mediators of risk. Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 55(12), 1345-1353. doi:10.1111/jcpp.12249 
Schaefer, A., Nils, F., Sanchez, X., & Philippot, P. (2010). Assessing the effectiveness of a large database 
of emotion-eliciting films: A new tool for emotion researchers. Cognition & Emotion, 24(7), 
1153-1172. doi:10.1080/02699930903274322 
Schulreich, S., Gerhardt, H., & Heekeren, H. R. (2016). Incidental fear cues increase monetary loss 
aversion. Emotion, 16(3), 402-412. doi:10.1037/emo0000124 
Schulreich, S., Heussen, Y. G., Gerhardt, H., Mohr, P. N., Binkofski, F. C., Koelsch, S., & Heekeren, H. 
R. (2014). Music-evoked incidental happiness modulates probability weighting during risky 
lottery choices. Frontiers in Psychology, 4. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00981 
Schwarz, N. (2012). Feelings-as-Information Theory. In Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology 
(Vol. 1, pp. 289-308). SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Sévigny, S., & Ladouceur, R. (2003). Gamblers' irrational thinking about chance events: the 'double 
switching' concept. International Gambling Studies, 3(2), 149-161. 
doi:10.1080/1356347032000142261 
Sharot, T. (2011). The optimism bias. Current Biology, 21(23). doi:10.1016/j.cub.2011.10.030 
Sharpe, L. (2002). A reformulated cognitive–behavioral model of problem gambling. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 22(1), 1-25. doi:10.1016/s0272-7358(00)00087-8 
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2013). Life after p-hacking. Avances in Consumer 
Research, 41. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2205186 
Smallwood, J., Fitzgerald, A., Miles, L. K., & Phillips, L. H. (2009). Shifting moods, wandering minds: 






Stanton, S. J., Reek, C., Huettel, S. A., & LaBar, K. S. (2014). Effects of induced moods on economic 
choices. Judgment and Decision Making, 9(2), 167-175. 
Steenbergh, T., Whelan, J., Meyers, A., May, R., & Floyd, K. (2004). Impact of warning and brief 
intervention messages on knowledge of gambling risk, irrational beliefs and behaviour. 
International Gambling Studies, 4(1), 3-16. 
Sylvain, C., Ladouceur, R., & Boisvert, J. (1997). Cognitive and behavioral treatment of pathological 
gambling: A controlled study. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, (5), 727. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 
185(4157), 1124-1131. 
Wagenaar, W. A., & Keren, G. B. (1988). Chance and luck are not the same. Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making, 1(2), 65-75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.3960010202 
Wallsten, T. S., Pleskac, T. J., & Lejuez, C. W. (2005). Modeling behavior in a clinically-diagnostic 
sequential risk-taking task. Psychological Review, 112(4), 862-880. doi:10.1037/e683332011-069 
Wang, Phillip. (2016). What is gambling disorder? Retrieved from https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-
families/gambling-disorder/what-is-gambling-disorder  
Watson, David, Clark, Lee Anna, & Tellegen, Auke. (1988). Development and validation of brief 
measures of positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, Vol 54(6), 1063-1070. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063 
Weber, E. U., Blais, A.-R., & Betz, N. (2002). A domain-specific risk-attitude scale: Measuring risk 
perceptions and risk behaviors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 15, 263-290. 
Westermann, R., Spies, K., Stahl, G., & Hesse, F. W. (1996). Relative effectiveness and validity of mood 
induction procedures: a meta‐analysis. European Journal of Social Psychology, 26(4), 557-580. 






White, T. L., Lejuez, C. W., & Wit, H. D. (2008). Test-retest characteristics of the Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task (BART). Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 16(6), 565-570. 
doi:10.1037/a0014083 
Wohl, M. J., & Enzle, M. E. (2002). The deployment of personal luck: sympathetic magic and illusory 
control in games of pure chance. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, (10), 1388. 
Wright, W. F., & Bower, G. H. (1992). Mood effects on subjective probability assessment. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 52, 276–291. doi:10.1016/ 0749-
5978(92)90039-A 
Xie, Z., Page, L., & Hardy, B. (2017). Investigating gender differences under time pressure in financial 
risk taking. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 11. doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2017.00246 
Yuen, K. S., & Lee, T. M. (2003). Could mood state affect risk-taking decisions? Journal of Affective 





































































       
      Men 
 
41 
      Women 59 
 
Ever given a mental health diagnosis 
 
       
      Yes 
 
21 
       No 79 
 
Currently have a mental health diagnosis 
 
        
      Yes 
 
17 








PANAS Score Information 
 
 Mean Std. Error of the Mean 
PANAS Time 1 Score- Positive   
       





       Negative Affect Condition 
 
3.31 .10 
PANAS Time 1 Score- Negative   
        





       Negative Affect Condition 
 
1.74 .09 
PANAS Time 2 Score- Positive   
        





       Negative Affect Condition 
 
3.23 .11 
PANAS Time 2 Score- Negative   
        





       Negative Affect Condition 
 
1.69 .10 
PANAS Change Score- Positive   
       





       Negative Affect Condition 
 
-.08 .09 
PANAS Change Score- Negative   
     





       Negative Affect Condition 
 
-.05 .08 






















         DOSPERT Correlations with Age and the BART 
 
 





     1 -.005 -.111 -.175 -.055 -.053 .061 -.111 





   -.005 1 -.083 -.020 -.116 .013 -.219* -.120 
  
        
 






                    






                    
                                                 
                                                
                                              
Figure 2. Visual representation of the BART trials. (A) depicts the BART trials. (B) shows the negative 
feedback screen, which appeared after trials in which the participant popped the balloon. (C) shows the 
positive feedback screen, which appeared after trials in which the participant stopped pumping the 
balloon and collected their points. (D) depicts the feedback screen with a warning message for those in 







Figure 3. Visual representation of the average number of pumps on the BART and standard errors for 
each of the four conditions: positive affect with warning messages, positive affect without warning 



















Figure 4. Visual representation of the negative correlational relationship between average number of 

































































































Figure 6. Visual representation of the means and standard errors of the scores on the DOSPERT domains 











































Figure 7. Visual representation of the means and standard errors of the scores on the DOSPERT domains 














Figure 8. Visual representation of the means and standard errors of the scores on the DOSPERT domains 































The following scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read 
each item and then select the number that corresponds with the choice that best describes how you are 
feeling right now. That is, indicate to what extent you currently feel this way. Remember, there are no 
right or wrong answers so please give us your honest opinion. 
 
Interested 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Distressed 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Excited 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Upset 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Strong 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Guilty 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Scared 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Hostile 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 











1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Proud 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Irritable 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Alert 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Ashamed 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Inspired 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Nervous 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Determined 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Attentive 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Jittery 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 








1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
      or not at all 
 
Afraid 
1      2     3     4     5 
      Very slightly      A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 

















































You will now read statements describing a variety of behaviors. Read each item and then select the 
number that corresponds with how likely it is that you would engage in that behavior. Remember, there 
are no right or wrong answers so please give us your honest opinion. 
 
 
Admitting that your tastes are different from those of your friends. (S) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Going camping in the wilderness, beyond the civilization of a campground. (R) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Betting a day’s income at the horse races. (F) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Buying an illegal drug for your own use. (H) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Cheating on an exam. (E) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Chasing a tornado or hurricane by car to take dramatic photos. (R) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. (F) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Consuming five or more servings of alcohol in a single evening. (H) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Cheating by a significant amount on your income tax return. (E) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Disagreeing with your father on a major issue. (S) 
1       2     3     4     5 










Betting a day’s income at a high stake poker game. (F) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Having an affair with a married man or woman. (E) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Forging somebody’s signature. (E) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Passing off somebody else’s work as your own. (E) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Going on a vacation in a third-world country without prearranged travel and hotel accommodations. (R) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Arguing with a friend about an issue on which he or she has a very different opinion. (S) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability or closed. (R) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. (F) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Approaching your boss to ask for a raise. (S) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Illegally copying a piece of software. (E) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Going whitewater rafting during rapid water flows in the spring. (R) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (e.g., baseball, soccer, or football). (F) 
1       2     3     4     5 









Telling a friend if his or her significant other has made a pass at you. (S) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Investing 5% of your annual income in a conservative stock. (F) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Shoplifting a small item (e.g., a lipstick or a pen). (E) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Wearing provocative or unconventional clothes on occasion. (S) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Engaging in unprotected sex. (H) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Stealing an additional TV cable connection off the one you pay for. (E) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Not wearing a seatbelt when being a passenger in the front seat. (H) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Investing 10% of your annual income in government bonds (e.g., treasury bills). (F) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Periodically engaging in a dangerous sport (e.g., mountain climbing or sky diving). (R) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Not wearing a helmet when riding a motorcycle. (H) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Gambling a week’s income at a casino. (F) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Taking a job that you enjoy over one that is prestigious but less enjoyable. (S) 
1       2     3     4     5 









Defending an unpopular issue that you believe in at a social occasion. (S) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Exposing yourself to the sun without using sunscreen. (H) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Trying out bungee jumping at least once. (R) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Piloting your own small plane, if you could. (R) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Walking home alone at night in a somewhat unsafe area of town. (H) 
1       2     3     4     5 
      Very unlikely    Unlikely    Not sure      Likely Very Likely 
 
Regularly eating high cholesterol foods. (H) 
1       2     3     4     5 




*H= health/safety domain, S= social domain, F= financial domain, R= recreational domain, E= ethical 
domain 
 
**Domain abbreviations were not presented to participants during the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
